The Impact of Brexit on EU Policies by De Ville, Ferdi & Siles-Brügge, Gabriel
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 1–6
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v7i3.2129
Editorial
The Impact of Brexit on EU Policies
Ferdi De Ville 1,* and Gabriel Siles-Brügge 2
1 Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University, 9000 Ghent, Belgium; E-Mail: ferdi.deville@ugent.be
2 Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 8UW, UK;
E-Mail: g.siles-brugge@warwick.ac.uk
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 28 March 2019 | Published: 16 September 2019
Abstract
While the result of the UK’s referendum on membership of the EU has been the subject of considerable scholarly interest,
relatively little has been written on the impact of Brexit on the EU. Where academics have addressed the issue, they have
tended to either see Brexit through the lens of European ‘(dis)integration’ theory or focused on its ‘static’ effects, assessing
the impact of removing the UK from the EU’s policymaking machinery based on its past behaviour. This editorial sets out
the overarching rationale of this thematic issue and introduces some key analytical elements drawn on by the individual
contributions. Given that Brexit has so far not set in trainmajor EU disintegration, the focus is on the detailed impact of the
UK’s exit across specific policy areas and on problematising the notion that it necessarily implies amore socially progressive
turn in EU policies. Our starting point is the fundamental uncertainty surrounding the future EU–UK relationship, and the
process of arriving there. This points to the importance of focusing on the ‘dynamic’ impacts of Brexit, namely adjustment
in the behaviour of EU actors, including in anticipation of Brexit, and the discursive struggle in the EU over how to frame
Brexit. Policy change may also occur as a result of small, ‘iterative’ changes even where actors do not actively adjust their
behaviour but simply interact in new ways in the UK’s absence. Several of the issue’s contributions also reflect on the UK’s
role as a ‘pivotal outlier’. The editorial concludes by reflecting on howwe analyse the unfolding Brexit process and on what
broader insights this thematic issue might offer the study of EU politics.
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1. Introduction
The vote for Brexit in the UK’s referendum on EU mem-
bership, held on 23 June 2016, has generated consid-
erable academic interest (for a review of books on the
topic, see Oliver, 2019). Most of these scholarly contribu-
tions have focused on either explaining the referendum
outcome (e.g., Curtice, 2017; Thompson, 2017) or on as-
sessing the consequences of withdrawal for the UK (e.g.,
Diamond, Nedergaard, & Rosamond, 2018; Seabrooke &
Wigan, 2017). Far less ink has been spilled on the impli-
cations of Brexit for the EU.
Where some scholars have begun to reflect on the
impact of Brexit on the EU, they have tended to do so
in one of two ways. One group has done so through
the lens of (grand) integration theory. Some have taken
Brexit to be one of the ‘disintegrative dynamics’ (such as
the refugee and Eurozone crises) threatening the sustain-
ability of the European integration project (e.g., Jones,
2018; Rosamond, 2016); others have taken a less stark
view, focusing on Brexit as an instance of ‘differentiated
(dis)integration’ across Member States and policy areas
(e.g., Henökl, 2018; Leruth, Gänzle, & Trondal, 2017). The
second group of scholars, adopting a more fine-grained
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approach focused on studying particular policy impacts,
has tended to home in on the ‘static’ effects of Brexit, in
other words, what the EU and its policies would look like
if the UK was simply ‘tak[en] out of the EU “equation”’
on the basis of its historical behaviour (Jensen & Snaith
2018, p. 255). This chimes with an often-heard expecta-
tion amongst commentators that Brexit will enable the
EU to pursue more socially-minded supranational poli-
cies, as ‘the UK would [have] block[ed] and veto[ed] any
future moves in that direction’ (Luyendijk, 2016).
In the absence of significant post-referendum disin-
tegration (see Börzel, 2018, p. 482), this thematic issue
aims to offer more systematic analysis of the likely ef-
fects of the UK’s withdrawal in specific EU policy areas.
It covers mostly ‘regulatory’ (such as the Single Market)
and ‘external’ policy areas (such as the EU’s trade and
foreign policies)—with one contribution focusing on the
‘redistributive’ Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In ad-
dition, this thematic issue seeks to problematise the
idea that the UK’s withdrawal will necessarily result in
more ‘progressive’ or ‘socially-minded’ EU policies (e.g.,
Copeland, 2019).
Although we seek to move beyond the more spe-
cific problématique of the European integration litera-
ture, our starting point is Ben Rosamond’s (2016, p. 865)
assertion that it is best ‘to think about disintegration as
an indeterminate process rather than an identifiable out-
come’. Speaking specifically about ‘Brexit-induced disin-
tegration’, he writes that ‘the best guess must be that
[it] will be messy, drawn out and unpredictable’ and
mediated by the EU’s existing ‘multi-institutional game’
(Rosamond, 2016, p. 868). We argue that in order to as-
sess Brexit’s impact on EU policies it is inadequate to
simply ‘take the UK out of the equation’, assuming that
the behaviour of other actors will remain unchanged
(static effects).
How the UK’s departure will affect the Union de-
pends on several currently or inherently indeterminate
conditions—and will be mediated by the EU’s institu-
tional structure. Firstly, there is the uncertainty about
the future EU–UK relationship. Secondly, and partly as
a result, actors will actively anticipate and respond to
Brexit.Wemight call these ‘dynamic’ effects (formore on
the distinction between static and dynamic effects, see
De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019). This includes a discursive
struggle in the EU over how to interpret Brexit and re-
spond appropriately. Even where actors do not directly
alter their behaviour in response to Brexit, the ‘iterative’
impact of actions taken in the UK’s absence may cumu-
late and lead to potentially unexpected consequences.
The speed and scale of change may also vary across dif-
ferent policy areas—or be conceptualised differently de-
pending on the theoretical lens adopted. Finally, the UK’s
past role in EU policies has beenmore nuanced and com-
plex than suggested by the common label of being a lib-
eral, but ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1998).
In the remainder of this editorial, we provide a little
more detail on the relevance of each of these elements,
illustrating this with arguments from the individual con-
tributions. The final section then offers some conclud-
ing thoughts on how to analyse the unfolding effects of
Brexit and reflects on the thematic issue’s wider contri-
bution to the study of EU politics.
2. Uncertainty about the Future Relationship
A central reason why it is difficult to assess the impact of
Brexit on EU policies is the uncertainty surrounding the
future relationship between the UK and the Union. The
sequenced nature of the Brexit negotiations—with the
negotiatedWithdrawal Agreement only covering divorce
issues and featuring a ‘backstop’ to prevent a hard bor-
der in Ireland—has meant that ‘the future relationship
will be negotiated only after the withdrawal agreement
is agreed’ (Gostyńska-Jakubowska & Lowe, 2018). The
Withdrawal Agreement, backstop notwithstanding, and
non-binding ‘political declaration’ do leave open what
kind of ‘future economic partnership’ will develop be-
tween the UK and EU. If long-term ‘No Deal’ and ‘No
Brexit’ scenarios are avoided, this future relationship, in
and beyond economic terms, may vary between the UK
remaining closely aligned to EU policies (a ‘soft Brexit’) or
the UK having some preferential economic arrangement
as under the EU’s free trade agreements with countries
like Canada or South Korea (a ‘hard Brexit’) with associ-
ated cooperation in other areas (see Figure 1 in De Ville
& Siles-Brügge, 2019).
The eventual outcome in this respect, and the tortu-
ous and uncertain path leading there, will have signifi-
cant effects across EU policy areas. Michelle Egan (2019)
contends that a harder Brexit may lead companies to re-
locate to the EU27—although the propensity to, and na-
ture of the,movewould vary between different sectors—
and prompt the EU to adopt ‘judicial, market, and insti-
tutional safeguards’ to protect the integrity of the Single
Market. Ferdi De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2019), in
turn, argue that a soft Brexit might, counterintuitively,
have a larger effect on the EU’s trade policy than a hard
Brexit. Fewer firms would relocate, including UK-based
businesses in the influential financial and business ser-
vices sectors, but they would lose direct representation
in Brussels.
3. Adjustment by EU Actors
The uncertainty surrounding the future relationship
points to theway inwhich the effects of Brexit on EU poli-
cies will depend on adjustments in the behaviour of both
societal and institutional actors. It should not be taken
for granted that these will simply stick to their pre-Brexit
preferences or strategies, including during any adjust-
ment process. In the agricultural policy field, for exam-
ple, farmers in the EU27 could respond to a potential loss
of market share in the UK by lobbying for more support
through the CAP (see Roederer-Rynning & Matthews,
2019). Institutional actors may also change their pref-
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erences or strategies after Brexit. Before the UK’s with-
drawal, Member States in the Council may have engaged
in political horse-trading with the UK, or they may have
relied on the UK to block proposals without the need to
explicitly state their own opposition. Brexit may there-
fore lead to shifts in positions, changes in the intensity
with which positions are defended or to new alliances.
In the European Parliament (EP), for example, member
parties of the erstwhile Alliance of Conservatives and
Reformists group (ECR) may realign in the absence of the
UK Conservative Party.
EU actors, moreover, have already begun to adjust
their preferences or strategies to Brexit since the ref-
erendum result. There has been evidence of firms al-
ready relocating from the UK to the EU27, which may
result in changes to the preferences of Member States
in different policy areas (as discussed above). Moreover,
the UK has effectively become a lame-duck Member
State, as ‘no-one will wish to listen seriously to its con-
cerns as they will inevitably be tainted by the thought
that they are linked to its future role outside the EU’
(Shackleton, 2016, p. 822). Since the referendum we
have also seen the establishment of an informal group of
northern, liberal-mindedMember States in the so-called
‘Hanseatic League’. We can also observe ‘anticipatory
adjustment’ in the actions of other institutional actors
such as the European Commission, which has strength-
ened its calls for the European Development Fund to be
folded into the EU budget (Price, 2019). Even if Brexit
does not occur, it will already have had an impact on EU
policies, with the UK’s lame-duck status likely to persist
through any extensions of Article 50. That said, it is diffi-
cult to fully disentangle the specific effects of Brexit from
all other developments since June 2016. Michael Smith
(2019) argues that the effects of Brexit on the EU’s ‘inter-
national roles’ will be less pronounced than other con-
temporaneous developments, including shifting geopo-
litical configurations and the rise of populism.
4. Framing Brexit
The uncertainty surrounding the Brexit process un-
derscores the importance of ideational dynamics. As
has been highlighted in the constructivist International
Political Economy literature, in times of ‘radical
uncertainty’—where actors cannot simply ‘read’ their
interests from material structures—ideas are crucial in
enabling authors to effectively navigate social life (Blyth,
2002, 2003). In this respect, interpreting the Brexit vote
has become key not only within the UK political system
(Oliver, 2017, p. 134), but also within the EU27, where a
discursive battle got underway shortly after the EU refer-
endum. Some, such as former French Economy Minister,
and now French President, Emmanuel Macron (cited in
Agence Europe, 2016a) have interpreted Brexit as ‘the ex-
pression of a need for protection’, arguing that it warrants
amore social Europe. This is now seen asmore achievable
without the UK at the table. A second group, who refer to
themselves as ‘euro-realists’, and which includes parties
in the ECR in the EP and at times also European Council
President Donald Tusk (see Barigazzi, 2016), sees Brexit
as a rejection of the federal ambitions of the European
project. They call on the Union to return to its tradi-
tional focus on establishing a ‘Common/Single Market’,
while shying away from integration in other areas (e.g.,
Sulik, 2017). Meanwhile, there are those like German
Chancellor AngelaMerkel (cited inAgence Europe, 2016b)
who do not advocate for a radical change to EU policies
but see a need for the Union to better explain to ‘citizens
the concrete advantages of the EU in their everyday lives’.
These discourses about and prompted by Brexit will af-
fect the direction and scale of change in different policy
domains. Some pro-liberalisation actors, for example, can
already be seen using Brexit to justify the EU’s continued
liberal trade policy orientation (De Ville & Siles-Brügge,
2019). Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that
Brexit is heightening the pressure on EU actors to justify
development cooperation in increasingly self-interested
terms (Price, 2019).
5. The Speed and Scale of Policy Change
While we might reflect on how Brexit has led to policy
changes as a result of the conscious/deliberate adjust-
ment of actor behaviour, the absence of the UKmay also
lead to smaller, ‘iterative’ changes within the existing in-
stitutional structures, where actors do not necessarily ac-
tively or consciously adjust their behaviour (Dupont &
Moore, 2019; we would like to acknowledge these au-
thors for clarifying this term). For example, the absence
of the UK in the Council or of British Members of the
EP may mean that over time less prominence is given to
certain proposals that they have (or would have) champi-
oned, such as in the area of climate change governance
(Dupont & Moore, 2019). The dynamics of change we
might observe here are those highlighted by the histor-
ical institutionalist literature, which has emphasised the
dynamics of path dependence and incremental change—
even where these processes might be ‘punctuated’ (e.g.,
Bulmer, 2009). In this vein, Paul Copeland (2019) high-
lights path dependence as constraining the development
of a post-Brexit European social dimension.
More generally, the contributions to this thematic is-
sue discuss Brexit-induced policy change and continuity
of different magnitudes. One could see some of the arti-
cles indirectly speaking to Peter Hall’s (1993) well-known
typology of ‘orders’ of policy change, showing how this
might occur at the level of: concrete policy ‘settings’;
the ‘instruments’ of policy; and/or in terms of overarch-
ing ‘policy paradigms’. For example, Christilla Roederer-
Rynning & Alan Matthews (2019) discuss not just the in-
fluence of the UK’s liberal environmental narrative on
the CAP, but also the impact of Brexit on the choice of
policy instruments (different modalities of agricultural
subsidy) as well as on policy settings (subsidy levels).
Two contributions, however, have also sought to explic-
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itly problematise such institutionalist understandings of
policy change and continuity by adopting critical femi-
nist and materialist political economy perspectives. Toni
Haastrup, KatharineWright and Roberta Guerrina (2019)
and Sophia Price (2019) emphasise the importance of
deeper structures and dynamics associated with, respec-
tively, gendered inequalities and capitalist expansion.
Such reflections on the nature of policy change and
continuity also point in the direction of the temporal and
spatial/institutional scale of Brexit’s impact on the EU.
The articles in this thematic issue focus on both themore
immediate—such as Brexit’s impact on current EU bud-
get negotiations (see Price, 2019; Roederer-Rynning &
Matthews, 2019)—but also the longer term—for exam-
ple, the impact on the EU’s ‘role’ in global politics (Smith,
2019). They also examine policy change operating at dif-
ferent levels. This includes both within the EU’s multi-
level systemof governance—for example, at the national
or supranational level—but also in terms of the EU’s pro-
jection as an international actor, including within the
global political economy (on the latter, see Price, 2019;
see also Rosamond, 2016).
6. The UK as a Pivotal Outlier
It is overly simplistic to depict the UK tout court as a lib-
eral and ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1998), whose depar-
ture might imply a more socially progressive and supra-
national orientation in EU policies. The positions that the
UK has taken across or even within (see Egan, 2019) pol-
icy domains over time are much more variegated than
such a description suggests. We therefore propose to de-
scribe the UK’s position across a number of policy areas
as that of a ‘pivotal outlier’ (Smith, 2019; we owe thanks
to the author for coining this term), across two dimen-
sions: time and in terms of its specific combination of
policy positions.
On the temporal dimension, the UK has, since acces-
sion, gone from playing a central role in shaping partic-
ular policy domains to assuming a lesser or more ‘outly-
ing’ position in subsequent policy development, for ex-
ample, when it comes to the CAP and the European so-
cial dimension (see, respectively, Roederer-Rynning &
Matthews, 2019; Copeland, 2019). On the latter dimen-
sion, the UK has assumed an ‘outlying’ combination of
positions on issues, even if it has been particularly asso-
ciated with market-based policy mechanisms that some
have referred to as ‘neoliberal’ (e.g., Copeland, 2019).
This has meant that it has played a pivotal role in sev-
eral different coalitions of Member States. Claire Dupont
and Brendan Moore (2019), for example, show how the
UK has pushed for the market-based Emissions Trading
System while still being a strong advocate of interna-
tional climate change negotiations. The UK has equally
been a key actor in promoting gender equality through
its foreign and security policy unlike the EU (Haastrup
et al., 2019). Similarly, there has been a tension between
the UK possessing ample diplomatic and other capabili-
ties, which have enhanced the EU’s external action, and
its (un)willingness to support collective EU foreign and
defence policy (Smith, 2019).
7. Conclusion
While this thematic issue underlines the impossibil-
ity of making definitive predictions about the impact
of Brexit on EU policies, we believe that it also il-
lustrates how informed reflection on its possible ef-
fects is feasible. To date, the most immediate obsta-
cle when it comes to examining the impacts of Brexit
is continued uncertainty about the outcome of EU–UK
negotiations—both concerning UK withdrawal from the
EU and the future economic partnership. However,
this does not preclude academic discussion altogether.
Rather, uncertainty can mean engaging in caveated,
conditional/scenario-dependent analysis or focusing on
the impacts so far of the vote for Brexit. Instead of just
being a constraint on the study of Brexit’s impact, un-
certainty is approached here as an important factor to
analyse in and of itself. It has already begun to influence
the behaviour of relevant actors before Brexit has even
occurred (and, dare we say it, even if it does not occur),
andwill continue doing so during the process of negotiat-
ing the UK’s withdrawal and future relationship with the
EU. The prominence of uncertainty leads us to cast this
thematic issue as an invitation to engage in further de-
bate and inquiry as events unfold. Equally, it is our hope
that the articles’ original perspectives will contribute to
the wider literature on the politics of different EU pol-
icy areas and to our understanding of the UK’s role in
the EU. More generally, assessing the role of a departing
Member State can also shed new light on the impact that
individual Member States can have on EU policies, for ex-
ample, as champions of certain frames and narratives or
as leaders of particular coalitions.
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